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DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL IGNORANCE, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

In this Debate, Professors Ilya Somin and Sanford Levinson discuss the constitutional implications of a federal government whose
“size, scope, and complexity” are far beyond anything that the framers
could have possibly imagined and an electorate that is more likely to
be able to name the Three Stooges than the three branches of their
government. Both professors agree that the situation is problematic
for our democratic form of government and that concerted efforts
could—and should—be taken to alleviate the problem. As to what
those steps should be, they offer two very different solutions.
Professor Somin begins by agreeing with critics of the U.S. Constitution, such as Professor Levinson, that “our present constitutional system has significant flaws.” He worries, however, that constitutional reforms made in the midst of widespread political ignorance carry no
guarantee of establishing anything better. Instead, Professor Somin
advocates addressing the problem by “reduc[ing] the overweening
power of government over society.” Although large-scale reductions
are unlikely in the short term, he asserts that the process can begin by
“reestablish[ing] constitutional limits on government power that have
eroded over the last several decades.”
Professor Levinson argues, however, that a return to a radically
smaller replublic is simply not plausible and efforts to effect such
change are akin to “swimming upstream, perhaps against a waterfall.”
We would be better served, he believes, by adapting our Constitution
to match the complexity of the modern state. Through an increase in
the number of U.S. senators and representatives, a decrease in the
time between the election and inauguration of a new President, and a
reduction in the “full-life” tenure of Supreme Court Justices, Professor
Levinson contends that our Constitution can be adapted to take significant steps toward achieving a “more perfect Union.”
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OPENING STATEMENT
Ilya Somin
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In Federalist No. 62, James Madison warned that “[i]t will be of little
avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own
choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so
incoherent that they cannot be understood.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 62,
at 381 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Unfortunately,
the dangerous state of affairs Madison warned against has come to
pass. The size, scope, and complexity of American government have
grown so great that it is often impossible for the electorate to acquire
enough knowledge to exercise meaningful democratic control.
Critics of the U.S. Constitution have long argued that it isn’t sufficiently democratic. My partner in this exchange, Professor Sanford
Levinson is one of the leading modern advocates of this view. I agree
with him that our present constitutional system has significant flaws.
At the same time, however, I am skeptical that constitutional reform is
likely to alleviate the most important factor undermining democracy
in our political system: widespread political ignorance exacerbated by
the enormous size and scope of modern government. Political ignorance also reduces the chance that we can successfully enact other
constitutional reforms that might improve the system without necessarily making it more democratic. The situation is not entirely hopeless, but I am skeptical that radical improvements in the constitutional
structure can be achieved in the near future.
THE POLITICS OF IGNORANCE
Democratic control of American government is severely weakened
by widespread political ignorance. Yet even a significantly more attentive public than the one we currently have is unlikely to acquire adequate knowledge of more than a fraction of the government’s wideranging activities.
For decades, public opinion researchers have found very low levels
of public knowledge on a variety of issues. For example, in a survey
taken a few months before the 2004 election, over seventy percent of
the public did not realize that Congress had passed President George
W. Bush’s prescription drug plan, the largest new federal program in
†
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1

decades. Only thirty-two percent know that Social Security is one of
2
the two largest items in the federal budget. More recently, pluralities
of the public believed that WMDs had been found in Iraq long after
3
the failure to find them became clear.
The public is also often ignorant of basic structural facts about the
political system. A 2006 Zogby poll showed that only forty-two percent
4
can name the three branches of the federal government. Similarly,
about half of the public believes that the President has the power to
5
suspend the Constitution, and only twenty-eight percent can name
6
two or more of the five rights protected by the First Amendment.
Not only are citizens often ignorant of basic information, they also
routinely do a poor job of evaluating the knowledge that they do have.
Studies repeatedly show that voters evaluate political information in
much the same way that sports fans evaluate information about their
favorite team: they overvalue information that makes their side look
good and discount data that cuts the other way.
Public ignorance and irrationality about politics is not accidental
or merely the result of stupidity. Political ignorance is in fact rational
behavior. Since there is only an infinitesimally small chance that any
one vote will affect the outcome of an election, it is rational for most
voters to devote little or no time to acquiring information that would
improve their chances of picking the right candidate or party. It is
also rational for them to be illogical in their evaluation of the knowledge that they do possess. Since there is little incentive to acquire political knowledge purely for the sake of being a better voter, most
knowledge is acquired for other reasons, including the pleasure of
rooting for one’s preferred political “team” or having one’s biases
1

KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SELECTED FINDINGS ON THE NEW MEDICARE DRUG
LAW 5 (2004), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/Selected-Findings-on-the-NewMedicare-Drug-Law.pdf.
2
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SURVEY OF AMERICANS ON HIV/AIDS 8 (2004),
http://www.kff.org/hivaids/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&Page
ID=36560.
3
Program on Int’l Pol’y Attitudes, PIPA-Knowledge Networks Poll: Americans on Iraq
War and Finding Weapons of Mass Destruction 4 (2003), http://www.pipa.org/
OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqFindWMD_May03/IraqFindWMD%20May03%20quaire.pdf.
4
ZOGBY INT’L, ZOGBY POLL: AOL NATIONAL 3 (2006), http://www.zogby.com/wfAOL%20National.pdf.
5
RICK SHENKMAN, JUST HOW STUPID ARE WE? FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE AMERICAN VOTER 24 (2008).
6
McCormick Tribune Freedom Museum, The Forum for Education and Democracy,
Americans’ Awareness of First Amendment Freedoms, Mar. 1, 2006,
http://www.forumforeducation.org/node/147.
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confirmed. Unbiased evaluation of evidence gets in the way of these
objectives and so most of us don’t try very hard to control those biases.
The size and scope of modern government ensures that even a
much higher level of knowledge might not be sufficient to ensure
democratic control of government. Government spending accounts
for some thirty-seven percent of the U.S. GDP, and that figure predates the recent massive bailout and stimulus bills. USGovernmentSpending.com, U.S. Government Spending as Percent of GDP,
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_20th_century_chart.html
(last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
The government also extensively regulates most aspects of our
lives. Even a relatively well-informed public is unlikely to know about
much more than a fraction of this government activity. Similarly, it is
doubtful that most voters actually understand the contents of the recently enacted stimulus bill.
There are many different normative theories of democratic participation, and some demand higher levels of public knowledge than
others. But even the relatively undemanding ones require greater
knowledge than most of the public possesses. For example, advocates
of “retrospective voting” believe that the public merely needs to know
enough to toss out incumbents when they are performing badly. But
this implies that the public should know which government officials
are responsible for what issues and how effective their policies have
been relative to the available alternatives. The public usually votes
against incumbents during economic downturns and for them in
times of prosperity. This heuristic ignores the possibility that a recession would have been even worse under alternative policies or a period of prosperity even better. Simple-minded attribution of the status
quo to incumbents leads voters to systematically make foolish mistakes
such as voting against incumbent governors in farm states during
times when crop production is depressed by weather. Christopher H.
Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses
to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks 20-29 ( Jan. 27, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.international.ucla.edu/
media/files/PERG.Achen.pdf.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The reality of widespread political ignorance and irrationality has
important implications for constitutional reform intended to make
government more democratic. One is that we are unlikely to greatly
strengthen democratic control of government without reducing the

243

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

[Vol. 157: 239

knowledge burden imposed on voters by the size and scope of the
modern state.
A second and even more pessimistic implication is that political
ignorance might well influence the content of constitutional change
for the worse. Under modern conditions, any amendment process
would require broad public participation to have legitimacy. This
gives political leaders opportunities to manipulate public opinion to
approve constitutional change that benefits narrow interest groups at
the expense of the general public or otherwise causes more harm
than good. Such manipulation is particularly likely in a time of crisis
like the present, when the combination of fear and ignorance might
lead the public to approve dangerous policies sold as “emergency”
measures. Many liberal scholars believe, with some justification, that
this is exactly what happened in the case of policies that imposed excessive restrictions on civil liberties in the aftermath of 9/11. In my
scholarship on the 1930s, I presented evidence that the economic crisis of the Great Depression allowed political leaders to exploit public
ignorance to build support for similarly dubious emergency policies.
Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New
Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595 (2003). For example, the
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, familiar to law students because it
was upheld in the famous Supreme Court case of Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), artificially increased food prices at a time when
widespread economic hardship had already brought many of the poor
to the brink of malnutrition. During World War II, the public overwhelmingly supported President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to
intern over 150,000 Japanese-Americans, in part because the public
was ignorant of the reality that they posed little or no security threat.
Public ignorance helped ensure the enactment of these dubious
emergency policies despite the fact that many of them arguably violated the existing Constitution. Opening the door to large-scale alteration of the Constitution itself could potentially be even more dangerous, since it does away with the admittedly imperfect constraint
imposed by judicial review that can sometimes strike down government overreaching as a violation of the current Constitution.
Although the existing Constitution has important shortcomings,
there is no guarantee that we will end up with a better one if we open
the door to large-scale revision during a time of crisis.
This in turn brings us to the issue of whether the U.S. Constitution should be made easier to amend. One of the most common
criticisms of the U.S. Constitution is that it is undemocratic because it
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is too difficult to amend. Generally speaking, Article V of the Constitution requires that an amendment have two-thirds support in each
house of Congress and also get the support of three quarters of state
legislatures. As a practical matter, this makes it almost impossible to
enact any major amendment. A small minority can potentially stymie
an amendment favored by a large majority. Scholars such as Akhil
Amar, Bruce Ackerman, and Professor Levinson have all argued for
allowing revisions to the Constitution without going through the Article V process.
I agree with Professor Levinson and other critics that Article V is
too restrictive. However, the problem of political ignorance should
lead us to tread warily in circumventing it. By requiring a large supermajority for a constitutional amendment, Article V makes it difficult to change the Constitution by manipulating political ignorance
during a crisis. In order to pass, an Article V amendment needs to
have strong support from the knowledgeable minority of voters as well
as from the relatively ignorant majority. We may still wish to change
Article V (as I believe we should). But any alternative amendment
mechanism should still require a broad supermajority in order to protect against the manipulation of political ignorance, as well as other
dangers.
Obviously, these concerns could be set aside if the status quo Constitution were so abysmal that almost any reasonable alternative would
be better. However, it is important to remember that the United
States remains one of the most successful polities in the world. We
have a higher standard of living than any other major nation, and
have remained a magnet for immigrants from all over the world.
Compared to Western European and Asian democracies, we have
been more successful than most in integrating large numbers of people from many different backgrounds into the mainstream of our society. On the foreign policy front, we have successfully overcome the
challenge of fascism and communism and—despite the errors of the
Bush administration—will likely prevail in the present battle against
radical Islamism. I say all this not to excuse the many shortcomings of
the U.S. political system but to emphasize that things could be a lot
worse, especially in a situation where the content of any radical reform
would be heavily influenced by political ignorance.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
In conclusion, I ask the same question Lenin posed in his eponymous 1902 book. Lenin, too, was frustrated by widespread political
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ignorance and believed that the only way forward was to concentrate
political power in the hands of a well-informed political elite—the
“vanguard” later known as the Communist Party. In our time, some
scholars who recognize the dangers of political ignorance advocate far
more modest versions of Lenin’s solution, arguing for increasing the
authority of expert administrators insulated from the political process.
Cass Sunstein and Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer are two of
the best known.
I am skeptical of the desirability of elite-led governance. Thus, I
would prefer to address the problem of political ignorance by reducing the size and scope of government altogether, thereby narrowing
the range of decisions that will be influenced by the rational ignorance of voters without at the same time concentrating power in the
hands of a small elite. I realize, however, that large-scale reductions in
the size of government are unlikely in the near future. We are, in fact,
more likely to see continued large-scale expansions of its power.
Thus, I urge a more modest reform program. Where possible, we
should work to reestablish constitutional limits on government power
that have eroded over the last several decades. For example, it is
probably impossible and undesirable to fully roll back the massive
regulatory state established since the New Deal. But it may be feasible
to modify or overrule decisions such as Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005), which give Congress essentially unlimited authority to regulate
almost any activity. When the present crisis abates, it may become politically feasible to promote reductions in the size and scope of American government, as occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
Political ignorance and its impact on democracy are far from the
only factors that we must take account of in considering the appropriate role of government in society. But they deserve greater attention
than they have received so far.
Even more modestly, advocates of constitutional reform should be
aware of the challenges posed by political ignorance and the limits it
places on our ability to make the constitution more democratic.
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REBUTTAL
Sanford Levinson

†

There is obviously much to agree with in Professor Somin’s Opening Statement. Begin only with the fact that it is certainly true that
modern government is almost infinitely more complex than anything
that was likely to be conceivable to the framers of the 1787 Constitution. The ubiquity of the “modern administrative state,” for starters,
would have been as mysterious a notion as the development of an air
force to complement the constitutionally stipulated army and naval
forces. When John Adams moved the national government from
Philadelphia to Washington in May 1800, there were apparently only
about 125 employees for the entire federal government. Anyone who
has physically observed the shelf space taken by early copies of the
Public Laws of the United States (or, for that matter, of the Supreme
Court Reports) knows how much more one can plausibly be said to
“need to know” in order to be on top of modern government. Indeed, one need not even compare the present against two centuries
ago. The Congress of only a half-century ago was scarcely, if at all,
concerned with health, education, or environmental policy, even
though that would change soon enough with the arrival of the Kennedy, Johnson, and, lest we forget, the Nixon administrations. And,
for what it is worth, we might note as well that the “United States”
conceptualized in 1787 included roughly three million people living
in territory extending southward from what is now Maine to the
southern border of Georgia, and westward to the east bank of the Mississippi River. There are so many ways that the modern American polity differs from anything imagined (or even imaginable) in 1787!
Perhaps we should really be debating whether Madison was actually correct in Federalist Nos. 10 and 14 in defending the possibility of
an “extended republic,” as against the far smaller (and more homogeneous) vision of republican government held by such eminent political theorists as Montesquieu and, in many ways, Jefferson. After all,
when Professor Somin brings up the well-known and much discussed
“irrationality” of engaging oneself politically, including paying the
significant costs in getting information relevant to having an informed
opinion about a complex issue of public policy, he is implicitly agree†

W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
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ing that the “extended” republic simply makes it more and more rational in effect to drop out—to tend one’s garden or pursue other
purely “private” interests—rather than participate as literally one
among many millions in elections where there is no practical possibility that one’s vote will “matter” in anything other than a civil religious
sense involving the satisfaction one takes personally when participating in a civic ritual.
But we live in the world we do, and there is no plausible narrative
that has us turning back to an earlier world. We will not return to a
smaller republic, whether that be defined simply spatially—i.e., a
United States made smaller by the breakup into several separate countries—or by reference to the scope of issues that are viewed as a legitimate part of the political agenda. For good or for ill, the last election, and the present atmosphere of “crisis,” both domestic and
international, economic and more conventional national security, assures that ever more governmental regulation—and, therefore, added
complexity—is in our future. If we demand anything approaching a
sophisticated knowledge of the issues as a condition for the kind of
civic deliberation linked with the notion of a “Republican Form of
Government” envisioned by the Constitution, we might well be condemned as hopelessly quixotic and utopian.
These are not happy times for anyone who takes seriously the notion of a “Republican Form of Government,” which in the modern
world must translate into some reasonably robust form of “democracy”—i.e., decision making that in some meaningful sense is traceable to the public in whose name the government acts. After all, the
United States, under Presidents of both of the major parties, has declared itself committed to the goal of spreading democracy around
the world. The deep undercurrent of Professor Somin’s comments
challenge the meaningfulness, or perhaps even wisdom, of this goal
given the widespread ignorance that he identifies. And there is surely
little reason to have greater optimism about most other countries,
even if some specific ones (perhaps Iceland or Sweden) might score
significantly higher in relevant public knowledge.
So we must wrestle with the phenomenon of the “widespread political ignorance” that is indeed our present condition. Part of the
problem may be general American culture. Former Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor has recently complained that “[t]wo-thirds of Americans know at least one of the judges on the Fox TV show American Idol,
but less than one in ten can name the Chief Justice of the United

Political Ignorance

2009]

248

7

States Supreme Court.” She might easily have also cited an August
2006 Zogby Poll that found that three times as many Americans could
name two of the Seven Dwarfs as could name an equal number of Supreme Court Justices (seventy-seven percent as against twenty-four
8
percent). Professor Somin notes the Zogby Poll indicating that fortytwo percent could name the three main branches of the national government; consider the fact that almost three-quarters of Americans
can rattle off the names of the Three Stooges (Larry, Curly, and
9
Moe). Even if one doubts the particular importance of knowing factoids like the names of the Justices, one might still be perturbed by
the abysmal ignorance about the most basic structural features of our
political system.
So what are the implications of these facts for anyone who bewails
the current state of the American constitutional republic, as I do, and
advocates significant structural changes? “One,” says Professor Somin,
“is that we are unlikely to greatly strengthen democratic control of
government without reducing the knowledge burden imposed on voters by the size and scope of the modern state.” I am reminded here of
Madison’s reminder in Federalist No. 10 that we could eliminate the
problem of “faction” by suppressing the “liberty” that inevitably generates “faction”; but, as he says, the cure would be worse than the disease. Thus his concern is with trying to imagine a government that at
one and the same time protects liberty and controls the more adverse
consequences of the faction that will accompany it. So the challenge
facing the modern designer is trying to imagine a more truly democratic (or “Republican Form of”) government in a modern world that
will most definitely not reduce the burdens imposed on participants.
Basically, Professor Somin offers a counsel of despair. His condition precedent for even thinking about constitutional change is a
radical transformation of American political culture that would seemingly require, for starters, the undoing of the New Deal and returning
to the more pristine vision of, say, President Calvin Coolidge. That I
disagree with him in his assessment of what would be desirable is beside the point, for there is simply no possibility of the condition being
met. So then he concludes, in effect, that because truly radical
change is unlikely, we should rather supinely accept the constitutional
7

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address at the Games 4 Change Annual Festival ( June 4, 2008), available at http://fora.tv/2008/06/04/Games_for_Change_
Sandra_Day_OConnor.
8
More Americans Know Snow White’s Dwarfs Than U.S. Supreme Court Justices, ZOGBY INT’L,
Aug. 15, 2006, http://www.zogby.com/search/ReadNews.cfm?ID=1208.
9
ZOGBY INT’L, ZOGBY POLL: AOL NATIONAL 3 (2006), http://www.zogby.com/
wf-AOL%20National.pdf.
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status quo (in the sense of the set of institutions bequeathed us by the
framers), in spite of his acknowledgment of “the many shortcomings
of the U.S. political system.” But it’s not so broken that we should
take the risks of changing it, given the widespread popular ignorance
and concomitant susceptibility to demagogic argument.
But even if one accepts the reality of popular ignorance and the
plausibility of the fears expressed by Professor Somin, are we really required to keep everything as it is rather than open the Pandora’s Box of
constitutional reform at all? My own desires are for extensive change.
I would eliminate equal voting power in the Senate tomorrow; there is
no justification for two senators from Maine being equal in power to
the two senators from California or, for that matter, Texas. Indeed,
like Larry Sabato, I would inject into the Senate a more “national”
perspective by having at least some number of senators who did not
come from geographically delimited areas at all. I recognize, however, that these hopes may be as utopian and quixotic as Professor
Somin’s call for returning to the good old days of the 1920s.
But what about more modest changes? Consider the remarkably
increased workload facing the modern Congress because of the enhanced agenda over the last half-century. As it happens, the House
and Senate assumed their present size in 1959, when Hawaii became
the fiftieth state to join the Union. Might it not make very good sense,
as advocated by University of Virginia political scientist Larry Sabato,
to increase the size of both institutions? Take only the Senate. Even if
one is forced to stick with the equal allocation of voting power, however objectionable it may be, why not elect three senators from each
state rather than two? Wouldn’t that make it at least marginally more
likely that there would be at least some senators who would be more
knowledgeable than is currently the case about the ever-more complex issues of public policy facing the Senate. One might hesitate to
change the size of the House from 435 to, say, 535; even now, there is
no possibility for genuine debate in the House, but it is worth asking if
the gains of increased membership might outweigh the costs.
Similarly, I see no reason why we might not emulate the framers
of the 20th Amendment by shortening the dysfunctional extended
hiatus between election and inauguration of a new President. Prior to
the 20th Amendment, proposed and adopted in 1933, a new president
wasn’t inaugurated until March 4th; the Amendment changed it to
January 20th. That’s still too long a hiatus in the world we now live in.
To be sure, further shortening at some point would necessarily require us to confront as well the Electoral College, a topic I have de-
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bated earlier in this forum with Professors Daniel Lowenstein and
John McGinness. Sanford Levinson, Daniel H. Lowenstein & John
McGinnis, Should We Dispense with the Electoral College?, Debate, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 10 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/
debates/pdfs/electoral_college.pdf.
Or consider a recent proposal drafted by Professors Paul Carrington of Duke and Roger Cramton of Cornell that would attempt to rein
in the “full-life” tenure of Justices of the United States Supreme Court
and replace it with de facto eighteen-year terms. Is this proposal, or
any of the ones mentioned above, to be ruled off the table of contemporary American politics? Is there nothing about the present Constitution that “We the People,” even in our present state of ignorance, rational or otherwise, could not meaningfully address in our hopes to
achieve a “more perfect Union”?
I fear that the message of Professor Somin’s essay is that we really
should give up on the democratic experiment itself, that it has simply
been overtaken by the conjoined events of a too-large and overreaching polity. That is an interesting and important argument, and it may
even be correct. But he should then address more fully what sort of
government we should realistically aspire to in the twenty-first century
in the absence of the radical political and cultural shifts he might have
as his first-order preference. I look forward to his reply.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Ilya Somin
I would like to thank Professor Levinson for his insightful and
thought-provoking reply to my initial essay. There are important points
of common ground between us. In particular, we seem to agree that
widespread political ignorance is a major obstacle to meaningful democratic control over government and that the problem is significantly
exacerbated by the size and scope of the modern state, which imposes
an enormous knowledge burden on voters. We also agree that the
public’s knowledge of The Three Stooges is far more extensive than their
relatively meager understanding of the Constitution and public policy;
though Professor Levinson may underestimate the political insights
that can be gained from watching The Three Stooges. We continue to
disagree over the implications of widespread political ignorance for
efforts to reform the Constitution to make it more democratic.
In my view, the combination of a crisis atmosphere and widespread political ignorance make it highly likely that any large-scale
constitutional change in the near future would cause more harm than
good. Professor Levinson apparently believes otherwise. As I hinted
in my Opening Statement, I think we can expect better results from
pursuing the more modest agenda of strengthening enforcement of
limits on government power that are already present in our existing,
admittedly flawed Constitution. In the slightly longer term, we might
also be able to diminish the danger posed by political ignorance by
pursuing incremental reductions in the size of government. By no
means do I counsel “despair,” as Professor Levinson suggests. Rather,
I think we can make modest but real progress if we proceed from a realistic understanding of the constraints that we face.
CAN WE MAKE THE CONSTITUTION MORE DEMOCRATIC WITHOUT
REDUCING THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT?
In my initial essay, I argued that the size, scope, and complexity of
modern government make it virtually impossible to impose meaningful democratic control over the state’s operations without reducing its
size and scope. Professor Levinson seems to disagree, and suggests
that we can enhance democracy through other constitutional reforms,
while keeping government at roughly its current size.
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Some of the ideas he puts forward have merit. For example, I
agree that it would be desirable to eliminate life tenure for Supreme
Court Justices and replace it with a nonrenewable eighteen-year term
(though, unlike Levinson, I believe that this reform would require a
constitutional amendment). I fail to see, however, how that would
strengthen democratic control of government. Term limits for Supreme Court Justices would in no way reduce the knowledge burden
on voters created by the size and scope of the modern state, which
spends over thirty-seven percent of American GDP every year and
regulates nearly every aspect of life. Perhaps Professor Levinson
merely means to suggest that term limits would enable public opinion
to have greater leverage over the composition of the Supreme Court,
because new Justices would be appointed more often. Maybe so. But
the vast scope of modern government has also made the Supreme
Court’s docket far more complex and varied than it once was. Few
voters understand much about the Supreme Court’s work beyond a
few hot-button issues such as abortion. Professor Levinson is one of
many legal scholars who have pointed out that public opinion—as reflected in the judicial confirmation process—tends to focus on a small
subset of the Court’s work that is often less significant than its impact
on other issues. As he points out in his Rebuttal, the public has very
little understanding of constitutional law and the other issues addressed by the Court. In fairness, however, even professional legal
academics (myself included) rarely have sufficient time and incentive
to acquire extensive knowledge of more than a small portion of the
work of the modern federal judiciary. Here, as elsewhere, democratic
control of government has been weakened by the size and scope of
the modern state.
I also support Professor Levinson’s proposal to cut back the
length of the transition period between the election of a new President and his or her inauguration. This idea has much to recommend
it, but it is unlikely to enhance democratic control of government
more than marginally.
I don’t have a strong opinion either way about Professor Levinson’s third proposed reform: increasing the size of the Senate from
two senators per state to three. Levinson believes that this will increase the average quality of the Senate’s deliberations, and perhaps
he is correct. However, the 435-member House of Representatives is
already almost three times as large as Professor Levinson’s proposed
150-member Senate and there is little if any evidence that it performs
significantly better than the Senate as a result. If Professor Levinson is
correct about the merits of this proposed reform, it still would not al-
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leviate the loss of democratic control facilitated by the expansion of
the size and scope of modern government. Even with a bigger Senate,
voters would still be electing senators (and representatives) while having little or no knowledge of most of the issues that the senators will
be deciding.
On the other hand, I do support the more radical version of Professor Levinson’s proposal: altering the composition of the Senate so
as to eliminate the requirement that each state have the same number
of senators regardless of its size. In my view (and Levinson’s), this
would reduce the massive agricultural subsidies and pork-barrel
spending that now flow to lightly populated states that have disproportionate voting power in the Senate. Unfortunately, however, this proposal has almost no chance of getting enacted as a constitutional
amendment; the small states that would be harmed by this reform
have more than enough leverage to block it. Indeed, Article V of the
Constitution states that no state “shall be deprived of its equal suffrage
in the Senate” even if a constitutional amendment mandating that result does get enacted.
IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM EFFORTS
In my original essay, I pointed out how the combination of widespread political ignorance and a crisis atmosphere greatly increases
the likelihood that constitutional-reform efforts will yield results that
make things worse rather than better. In particular, they make it easy
for politicians and interest groups to package dangerous changes as
“emergency measures.” In past crises, such as the Depression, World
War II, and the current War on Terror, many harmful policies were
enacted in precisely this way. Enacting changes to the Constitution in
this way might be even more harmful than enacting new statutes or
executive orders, because constitutional amendments are more difficult to reverse.
In his reply, Professor Levinson did not address this part of my argument. Perhaps he will do so in his next essay. In my view, this problem reduces the likelihood that even efforts to enact beneficial
changes in the Constitution will bear positive fruit. They too will have
to be filtered through a political process infected by fearmongering
and widespread voter ignorance. For reasons I laid out in my initial
essay, the danger is heightened if we circumvent the supermajority requirements of Article V, as Professor Levinson and some other scholars propose to do.
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I do not believe that these dangers automatically discredit all conceivable efforts at constitutional change during the present crisis.
They do, however, give us reason for great caution. At the very least,
would-be reformers should explain how they intend to enact beneficial reforms while guarding against the effects of fear and political ignorance that might deflect their agenda into more harmful directions.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
I concluded my original essay with this question, but admittedly
gave only a very brief answer to it. The problem I identify is not one
that can be fully addressed in the near future. However, I am not as
prone to “despair” as Professor Levinson suggests. Though it will not
be easy, we can make some limited but meaningful improvements.
As noted in my Opening Statement, we can strengthen efforts to
enforce the limits on government power already present in the text of
our current, admittedly imperfect, Constitution. Several of the Supreme Court decisions that license nearly unlimited government power
in various spheres rest on narrow five-four or six-three majorities. Two
good examples that I have written about extensively are Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (a six-three decision that endorsed unlimited
congressional authority to regulate virtually anything under the Commerce Clause, even though the Clause only gives Congress the power
to regulate interstate commerce), Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
507 (2006), and Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (a fivefour decision that reiterated previous cases giving government the
power to condemn property for virtually any reason, despite the Fifth
Amendment’s requirement that condemnations must be for a “public
use”), Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development
Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183 (2007). It is not impossible for changes in the composition of the Court to lead to the overruling of these cases and others like them. In recent years, in cases
such as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Supreme Court has begun to restrict
unbridled wartime executive power. Similar developments in the
Court’s jurisprudence on domestic policy issues could also occur. Indeed, the case for strict enforcement of constitutional limits on government power is actually stronger in the domestic policy realm, since
domestic policymaking requires less speed and secrecy.
In the longer term, we can also find ways to reduce the size and
scope of government through the political process. I agree with Pro-
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fessor Levinson that it is unlikely that we can cut government down to
the relative size it had back in the 1920s. However, we can potentially
make it significantly smaller than it is today. Other democracies have
achieved major reductions in the size and scope of government and
have been the better for it. For example, Ireland greatly reduced
spending, taxation, and regulation during the 1980s and 1990s, as a
result of which it went from being one of the poorest nations in Western Europe to having a per capita income almost as high as that of the
United States; Ireland even got to the point where its level of economic freedom also roughly equaled our own, despite being far more
statist before its reforms. New Zealand achieved similar results during
the same time period, ironically under a left-of-center Labour Party
government. On a lesser, but still significant, scale, our own federal
government’s spending declined from 22.1% of GDP in 1992 to
18.4% in 2000 during the Clinton Administration. OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, HISTORICAL TABLES 25
(2008).
Obviously, significant reductions in the size and scope of American government are unlikely over the next few years. To the contrary,
we will almost certainly move in the other direction. But constitutional scholars must look beyond the immediate future. As President
Obama has recognized, we face a looming fiscal crisis that will likely
increase pressure for reductions in federal spending within the next
decade. The current binge of government expansion will not continue indefinitely.
Addressing the problems of democracy and political ignorance
are not the only considerations involved in deciding how large a role
the state should play in our lives. If one believes that today’s level of
government intervention is essential to provide major benefits that
override the harm caused by loss of democratic control, then so be it.
But advocates of extensive government should at least provide a coherent explanation for why government can be expected to provide
the promised benefits despite the dangers of political ignorance and
the absence of meaningful democratic control over its policies. Recognizing the dangers of widespread political ignorance need not
make you a libertarian. But it should lead you to be more wary of assigning broad powers to the state than you might be otherwise. And if
we want to make our constitutional republic more democratic, we will
have to find ways to reduce the overweening power of government
over society.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Sanford Levinson
Once again, my thanks to Professor Somin for an interesting and
thoughtful reply. I do think that the nub of our dispute comes down
to the issue of “despair.” I certainly do not believe that Professor
Somin “counsels” us to despair in the sense of encouraging such a
disposition. Indeed, he is an optimist, not despairing at all about the
potential for at least alleviating, if not necessarily wholly fixing, the dilemma posed by the widespread political ignorance he identifies and
bewails. All we have to do is to rein in the powers of government, particularly, I presume, at the national level. One suspects that he would
endorse the general thrust of Richard Epstein’s Simple Rules for a Complex World, in which the first simple rule is, more or less, to say “no” to
most of what the national government has done at least since the New
Deal. I assume as well that he admires, as do I, Randy Barnett’s Restoring the Lost Constitution, perhaps the ablest articulation of a more-orless libertarian reading of the Constitution.
This is not the occasion for a full-scale debate about the merits of
libertarianism as either a political philosophy or a specific approach to
the Constitution. Although I admire Professor Barnett’s book (and,
for that matter, the intellectual provocations of Richard Epstein), it
does not mean that I am persuaded. But the far more important
point, as suggested in my initial response, is that Professor Somin basically admits that he is swimming upstream, perhaps against a waterfall, in arguing that the cure for what ails us as a political order is to
radically limit the powers of the national government to regulate the
economy or to provide basic welfare services. That view was decisively
rejected in the last election, with consequences that we read about in
our daily newspapers (or, for an increasing number of people, online).
Were I a libertarian, I would be in a state of despair at the present
political situation precisely because it appears so obvious that the current political zeitgeist is going in the other direction, where even
some staunch Republicans find themselves—I believe properly—
endorsing the nationalization of major economic institutions. Professor Somin’s nostrum of a diminished role for government is no more
likely to be generally accepted—at the present time or, I suspect, for
years to come—than my own nostrum of a new constitutional convention that would address whether or not our present Constitution, most
of whose truly important parts were drafted in Philadelphia in 1787, is
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adequate for our twenty-first-century lives. From the perspective of
people who disagree with us, I suspect we are both dismissed—though
not necessarily by the very same people—as “cranks,” “utopians,” or
“Don Quixotes” who refuse to accept the world as it is, which is one of
big (and getting bigger) government and resolute unwillingness to
think seriously about the adequacy of the Constitution we live under.
In a forthcoming article to appear in a symposium on the contemporary efficacy of Congress within our political structure, The Most
Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First Century, 89
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009), I take issue with a suggestion by
a fellow symposiast, UCLA Professor Barbara Sinclair, that “we need to
be hard nosed in our analysis and modest about our proposals.” Barbara Sinclair, Question: What’s Wrong with Congress? Answer: It’s a Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009). I obviously agree that it is desirable to “be hard nosed in our analysis”—
what would it mean to embrace “soft nosedness”?—but I disagree
strongly that this entails that we must be “modest about our proposals.” What links both Professor Somin and me is that, for better and,
no doubt some would assert, for worse, we firmly believe that we are
each engaged in hard-nosed thinking about the nature of contemporary politics and that what our noses have smelled leads us to be truly
“immodest” in our proposals. For some, of course, this last suggestion
will evoke Jonathan Swift and his own “immodest proposal” to solve
the overpopulation problem in Ireland. I presume that neither Professor Somin nor myself believes that we are writing satire. Each of us
is completely serious about our analysis and our proposed rectifications, however much we may disagree with each other. I take great
comfort, though, in noting Professor Somin’s agreement with some of
my specific proposals. Both of us, I take it, are dismayed by the spirit
of complacence that typifies the legal academy when presented with
radical critiques and proposals.
Let me confess that I am genuinely torn about the role that rhetorics of “crisis” and “emergency” do, descriptively, and should, normatively, play in the discussion of constitutional reform. I share his fear
about the ability particularly of Presidents, charismatic or otherwise,
to use such rhetoric as a way of amassing power, whether for the national government in general or the executive branch in particular.
For many of us, the administration of George W. Bush is, unlike truth
or beauty, all we know, and all we need to know, about the capacity for
abusive government and, concomitantly, the importance of adhering
to the original mantra of the national government being a govern-
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ment “of limited and enumerated powers.” James Madison, Speech in
Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480, 485 ( Jack Rakove ed., 1999). This explains my
own admiration for Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004), where he unfashionably took the Habeas Corpus
Clause with genuine seriousness, unlike his more “pragmatic” colleagues in the majority. No doubt there should be a major national
debate, conducted at the highest possible intellectual level—fat
chance!—about the implications of the remarkably transformative visions embraced in President Obama’s first budget and accompanying
justifications. That I am exhilarated by having a President who truly
wants to succeed (and in many ways supplant) FDR and Lyndon Johnson does not mean that the critiques offered by Professor Somin need
not be fully considered and responded to thoughtfully, with at least
some instances along the way of concessions to the validity of some of
those critiques.
This being said, I think it is also undoubtedly true that dinosaurs
like the American government change, if at all, only upon the perception of crisis and emergency. No doubt many skilled politicians would
agree with Rahm Emanuel’s now-famous comment that “[y]ou never
want a serious crisis to go to waste.” Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008, at A2. Or perhaps one
should equally invoke Samuel Johnson’s comment that “when a man
knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.” JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 713 (Roger
Ingpen ed., 1907) (1791). It is so easy to think of other things when
one assumes that the future is rosy or even relatively unthreatening.
The prospect of driving off a cliff, on the other hand, might truly clarify the debate. The all-important question is whether we can trust political leaders to identify true crises, as against the stirring up of fear
attendant on perception of a crisis for rank and partisan political purposes. Not the least dangerous feature of our political system is that
Presidents have a great incentive to scare the public, as a means both
of institutional aggrandizement and helping their political party win
the next election, which, under our system, is always occurring within
a maximum of two years.
The political ignorance that Professor Somin has identified is
surely one of the explanations for our remarkably coarsened general
political debate. As a rabid Democrat, I tend to focus on such figures
as Sarah Palin, “Joe the Plumber,” and Rush Limbaugh as typifying
everything that is wrong—perhaps even despair inducing—about our
present politics. No doubt Professor Somin would name some people
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I am more inclined to treat with the same seriousness that all too
many Republicans treat Palin et al. What I am confident of is that it is
possible to engage in serious debate with Professor Somin, Professor
Epstein, and Professor Barnett, to name only the academics mentioned above, without descending into name calling and irredeemable
cheap shots. Whether this is enough to overcome despair I leave to
the reader.
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